Guarded Deep Learning using Scenario-Based Modeling by Katz, Guy
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
03
86
3v
1 
 [c
s.S
E]
  6
 Ju
n 2
02
0
Guarded Deep Learning using Scenario-Based Modeling
Guy Katz
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
guykatz@cs.huji.ac.il
Keywords: Scenario-Based Modeling, Behavioral Programming, Machine Learning, Deep Neural Networks
Abstract: Deep neural networks (DNNs) are becoming prevalent, often outperforming manually-created systems. Un-
fortunately, DNN models are opaque to humans, and may behave in unexpected ways when deployed. One
approach for allowing safer deployment of DNN models calls for augmenting them with hand-crafted over-
ride rules, which serve to override decisions made by the DNN model when certain criteria are met. Here, we
propose to bring together DNNs and the well-studied scenario-based modeling paradigm, by expressing these
override rules as simple and intuitive scenarios. This approach can lead to override rules that are comprehensi-
ble to humans, but are also sufficiently expressive and powerful to increase the overall safety of the model. We
describe how to extend and apply scenario-based modeling to this new setting, and demonstrate our proposed
technique on multiple DNN models.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep machine learning (Goodfellow et al., 2016)
is dramatically changing our world, by allowing en-
gineers to create complex models using automated
learning algorithms (Gottschlich et al., 2018). These
learning algorithms generalize examples of how the
desired system should behave into an artifact called
a deep neural network (DNN), capable of correctly
handling new inputs — even if it had not encoun-
tered them previously. In many instances, DNNs
have been shown to greatly outperform manually-
crafted software. Examples of note include Al-
phaGO (Silver et al., 2016), which defeated some
of the world’s strongest human Go players; DNN-
based systems for image recognition with super-
human precision (Simonyan and Zisserman, 2014);
and systems in many other domains such as natu-
ral language processing (Collobert et al., 2011), rec-
ommender systems (Elkahky et al., 2015) and bioin-
formatics (Chicco et al., 2014). As DNNs are prov-
ing more accurate and easier to create than manually-
crafted systems, their use is expected to continue and
intensify in the coming decades. Indeed, there is now
even a trend of using DNNs in highly critical sys-
tems, such as autonomous cars and unmanned air-
craft (Bojarski et al., 2016; Julian et al., 2016).
DNNs have been demonstrating extraordi-
nary performance, but they also pose new chal-
lenges (Amodei et al., 2016). A key difficulty is
that DNNs are extremely opaque: because they are
generated by computers and not by humans, we can
empirically see that they perform well, but we do
not fully understand their internal decision making.
Consequently, it is nearly impossible for humans to
reason about the correctness of DNNs. For instance,
it has been observed that many state-of-the-art DNNs
for image recognition, which at first glance seemed
to perform spectacularly, could be fooled by slight
perturbations to their inputs (Szegedy et al., 2013).
This raises serious concerns about these net-
works’ safety and reliability. Initial attempts
are being made to automatically reason about
DNNs using formal methods (Katz et al., 2017;
Huang et al., 2017; Gehr et al., 2018;
Wang et al., 2018; Katz et al., 2019a), but these
approaches are currently of limited scalability. Fur-
ther, these approaches do not specify how to correct
an undesirable behavior in a DNN after it has been
discovered, which is also a difficult task.
Consider, for example, the case of the DeepRM
system (Mao et al., 2016a). The goal of this system is
to perform resource allocation: the system has avail-
able resources (e.g., CPUs and memory), and a queue
of pending jobs; and it needs to either schedule a
pending job and assign some of the resources to it,
or perform a “pass” action, in which no new jobs are
assigned resources and the system waits for executing
jobs to terminate and free up their assigned resources.
The goal is to schedule jobs in a way that maximizes
throughput. DeepRM achieves this by maintaining a
model of the system (resources, incoming jobs), and
using a pre-trained DNN to choose which action to
perform. DeepRM performs very well when com-
pared to state-of-the-art, manually created software
that tackles the same problem (Mao et al., 2016a).
Despite its overall satisfactory performance, the
authors of DeepRM report that the system may some-
times behave in undesirable ways. For example, the
controller might request that job x be allocated re-
sources, although no job x exists in the job queue.
In their implementation (Mao et al., 2016b), the au-
thors address this situation by introducing an over-
ride rule: a piece of code that examines the current
state of the system, and overrides the DNN’s decision
when this particular case is detected. Here, the over-
ride rule changes the controller’s selection to “pass”
whenever the controller requests to allocate resources
to a non-existent job. There are additional over-
ride rules included in DeepRM (Mao et al., 2016b),
and also in other systems (e.g., the Pensieve sys-
tem (Mao et al., 2017)). Moreover, since DeepRM’s
release, additional undesirable behaviors have been
discovered (Kazak et al., 2019), and addressing these
might require augmenting the system with yet addi-
tional override rules in the future.
These cases, and others, indicate that override
rules are becoming an integral component of DNN-
based models. As erroneous behaviors may be dis-
covered after the initial deployment phase, override
rules may need to be added, extended, enhanced and
refactored throughout the system’s lifetime. We argue
that this situation calls for leveraging suitable model-
ing techniques, in a way that will facilitate creating
and maintaining override rules — leading to overall
increased system reliability.
In this paper we advocate the use of
the scenario-based modeling (SBM) frame-
work (Harel et al., 2012b; Damm and Harel, 2001)
for creating override rules. In SBM, individual
system behaviors are modeled as independent
scenarios, and are then automatically interwoven
when the model is executed in order to produce
cohesive system behavior. SBM has been shown
to afford several benefits in system design and
automated maintenance, and is particularly suitable
for incremental development — which is a highly
desirable trait when dealing with override rules. We
propose here a method for applying SBM to systems
with DNN components, in a way that allows to
specify override rules as SBM scenarios. We discuss
the benefits of the approach (in particular, those
afforded by the amenability of SBM to automated
analysis (Harel et al., 2015c)), and demonstrate its
applicability to a few recently proposed systems.
Although our focus here is on systems with DNN
components, our approach could be extended to
systems with different kinds of opaque components.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 we provide the necessary background on
SBM, DNNs and override rules. Next, in Section 3
we present our method for applying SBM to systems
with DNN components. In Section 4 we describe an
evaluation of our approach, followed by a discussion
of related work in Section 5. We conclude in Sec-
tion 6.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Deep Neural Networks and
Override Rules
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are directed graphs,
in which the nodes (neurons) are organized into lay-
ers. The first layer is the input layer, the last layer
is the output layer, and the multiple remaining layers
are the hidden layers. Each node in the network (ex-
cept for input nodes) is connected to nodes from the
preceding layer, using predetermined weight values
(an illustration appears in Fig. 1). Selecting appropri-
ate weight values is key, and is performed during a
training phase, which is beyond the scope of this pa-
per (for a survey, see, e.g., (Goodfellow et al., 2016)).
A DNN is evaluated by assigning values to its input
neurons, and then propagating these values forward
through the network, each time computing values for
a given layer from the values of its predecessor. Even-
tually, the output values (i.e., the values of neurons in
the output layer) are computed, and are returned to
the user. Often, DNNs are used as controllers or clas-
sifiers, in which case it is typical to return to the user
the index of the output neuron that received the high-
est value. This neuron indicates the action, or classi-
fication, determined by the DNN.
For our purpose here, it is enough to regard a DNN
as a black box, that transforms an input into an out-
put. However, for completeness, we briefly describe
how a DNN is evaluated. The value of each hid-
den node in the network is computed by calculating
a weighted sum of the node values from the previous
layer, according to the edge weights. Then, a non-
linear activation function is applied to this weighted
sum (Goodfellow et al., 2016), and its result becomes
the value of the node being computed. For simplicity
we focus here on the Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU)
activation function (Nair and Hinton, 2010), given by
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Figure 1: A fully connected DNN with 5 input nodes (in green), 5 output nodes (in red), and 4 hidden layers containing a total
of 36 hidden nodes (in blue).
ReLU(x) = max(0,x). Thus, when a node uses the
ReLU activation function, its value is calculated as the
maximum of the linear combination of nodes from the
previous layer and 0.
Fig. 2 depicts a small DNN that will serve as a
running example. The network acts as a controller: it
has two inputs, x1 and x2; three hidden neurons, v1,v2
and v3, each with the ReLU activation functions; and
it selects one of two possible actions through its out-
put neurons, y1 and y2. We slightly abuse notation,
and use y1 and y2 to denote both the neurons and the
actions/classes those neurons represent. The selected
action is the one assigned the highest score. We see,
for example, that assigning x1 = 1,x2 = 0 results in
output values y1 = 1,y2 = 0, i.e., action y1 is selected;
whereas x1 = 0,x2 = 1 leads to y1 = 0,y2 = 3, i.e. ac-
tion y2 is selected.
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Figure 2: A small neural network with a single hidden layer.
An override rule is a triple 〈P,Q,α〉, where P is
a predicate over the network’s inputs, Q is a predi-
cate over the network’s outputs, and α is an override
action. The semantics of these rules is that if P and
Q hold for a network’s evaluation, then output action
α should be selected — regardless of the network’s
output. For example, we might specify the rule
〈x1 > 0∧ x2 < x1, true,y2〉
which would be triggered for inputs x1= 1,x2= 0. As
we saw previously, in this case the network outputs
y1; but with the override rule, this selection would be
changed to y2. By setting Q to true, we created an
override rule the only examines the DNN’s inputs. We
could, for example, set Q to y2 > 10, in which case
the rule would not be triggered for x1 = 1,x2 = 0. By
adjusting P and Q, the aforementioned formulation
can express many common override rules, such as the
rule in the DeepRM example described in Section 1.
2.2 Scenario-Based Modeling
Scenario-based modeling (Harel et al., 2012b) is an
approach for modeling complex reactive systems. At
the core of the approach lies the notion of a scenario
object: a description of a single behavior, whether de-
sirable or undesirable, of the system being modeled.
Each scenario object is created separately, and does
not directly interact with the other scenarios; instead,
it only interacts with a global execution mechanism.
This execution mechanism can execute a set of sce-
narios in a way that produces cohesive, global behav-
ior.
There are several flavors of scenario-based mod-
eling, which may differ in the various idioms that
a scenario object uses to interact with the execu-
tion mechanism and affect the overall execution of
the system. Here, we focus on the commonly
used idioms of requesting, waiting-for and blocking
events (Harel et al., 2012b). When executed, each
scenario object may declare it has reached a syn-
chronization point, in which the execution infrastruc-
ture must trigger an event. The object then spec-
ifies which events it would like to have triggered
(requested events); which events it forbids from be-
ing triggered (blocked events); and which events
it does not actively request, but should be notified
in case they are triggered by the execution mecha-
nism (waited-for events). The execution infrastruc-
ture waits for all the scenario objects to synchronize
(or just for a subset thereof, depending on the seman-
tics used (Harel et al., 2013a)); selects an event that is
requested and not blocked for triggering; and informs
any relevant scenario object that this event has been
triggered.
A toy example of a scenario-based model appears
in Fig. 3. The model depicted therein belongs to a
system that controls the water level in a tank with
hot and cold water taps. Each scenario object is de-
picted as a transition system, where the nodes repre-
sent the predetermined synchronization points. The
scenario object ADDHOTWATER repeatedly waits for
WATERLOW events and requests three times the event
ADDHOT; and the scenario object ADDCOLDWATER
performs a symmetrical operation with cold water.
In a model that includes only the objects ADDHOT-
WATER and ADDCOLDWATER, the three ADDHOT
events and three ADDCOLD events may be triggered
in any order during execution. In order to maintain
the stability of the water temperature in the tank, the
scenario object STABILITY enforces the interleaving
of ADDHOT and ADDCOLD events by using event
blocking. The execution trace of the resulting model
is depicted in the event log.
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Figure 3: (From (Harel et al., 2014)) A scenario-based
model of a system that controls the water level in a tank
with hot and cold water taps.
SBM has been implemented in a variety of high-
level languages, such as Java (Harel et al., 2010),
C++ (Harel and Katz, 2014), JavsS-
cript (Bar-Sinai et al., 2018) and Scenari-
oTools (Greenyer et al., 2017). The methodology
has been successfully used in modeling complex
systems, such as web-servers (Harel and Katz, 2014),
cache coherence protocols (Harel et al., 2016a) and
robotic controllers (Gritzner and Greenyer, 2018).
For simplicity and generality, in the remainder of this
paper we mostly describe scenario-based models in
terms of transitions systems.
Following the definitions in (Katz, 2013), we for-
malize the SBM framework as follows. A sce-
nario object O over event set E is a tuple O =
〈Q,δ,q0,R,B〉, where the components are interpreted
as follows:
• Q is a set of states, each representing one of the
predetermined synchronization points;
• q0 is the initial state;
• R : Q→ 2E and B : Q→ 2E map states to the sets
of events requested and blocked at these states (re-
spectively); and
• δ :Q×E → 2Q is a transition function, indicating
how the object reacts when an event is triggered.
Scenario objects can be composed into a sin-
gle, larger scenario object, as follows. For objects
O1 = 〈Q1,δ1,q10,R
1,B1〉 and O2 = 〈Q2,δ2,q20,R
2,B2〉
over a common event set E , we define the com-
posite scenario object O1 ‖ O2 as O1 ‖ O2 = 〈Q1×
Q2,δ,〈q10,q
2
0〉,R
1∪R2,B1∪B2〉, where:
• 〈q˜1, q˜2〉 ∈ δ(〈q1,q2〉,e) if and only if q˜1 ∈
δ1(q1,e) and q˜2 ∈ δ2(q2,e); and
• The union of the labeling functions is defined in
the natural way; e.g. e ∈ (R1 ∪ R2)(〈q1,q2〉) if
and only if e ∈ R1(q1) ∪ R2(q2), and e ∈ (B1 ∪
B2)(〈q1,q2〉) if and only if e ∈ B1(q1)∪B2(q2).
A behavioral model M is defined as a collection
of scenario objects O1,O2, . . . ,On, and the executions
of M are the executions of the composite object O =
O1 ‖ O2 ‖ . . . ‖ On. Each such execution starts from
the initial state of O, and in each state q along the run
an enabled event is chosen for triggering, if one exists
(i.e., an event e ∈ R(q)−B(q)). Then, the execution
moves to a state q˜ ∈ δ(q,e), and so on.
One extension of SBM, which will be use-
ful in our context, is to treat events as vari-
ables (Katz et al., 2019b). For example, an event e
can be declared to be of type integer. Then, one
scenario object might request e ≥ 5, while another
object might block e ≥ 7. The execution frame-
work would then employ a constraint solver, such
as an SMT solver (Barrett and Tinelli, 2018), to re-
solve the constraints and trigger, e.g., the event e= 6.
We omit here the formal definition of this exten-
sion, which is straightforward, and refer the interested
reader to (Katz et al., 2019b).
3 MODELING OVERRIDE
SCENARIOS
In the DeepRM case, override rules have been
added as unrestricted Python code within the mod-
ule that invokes the DNN and processes its re-
sult (Mao et al., 2016b). Thus, while the DNN con-
troller itself is clearly structured and well defined,
override rules are phrased as arbitrary pieces of code.
This could lead to several complications: (i) as the
number of override rules increases, they might be-
come convoluted and difficult to comprehend, ex-
tend and maintain; (ii) the semantics of override rules
might be unclear. For example, in the case of multi-
ple rules that can all be applied, which one prevails?
Is there a particular order in which they should be
checked? Can rules interact? etc; and (iii) the con-
ditions employed within these override rules might
become more complex, hiding away some of the
model’s logic where other developers might not ex-
pect to find it.
Here, we propose to model override rules using
SBM, as a means for mitigating these difficulties.
SBM is geared towards incremental modeling, which
seems a particularly likely scenario when DNNs are
involved: due to the opacity of DNNs, some unde-
sirable behaviors are likely to be detected only after
deployment, requiring the addition of new override
rules. Further, SBM’s simple semantics would guar-
antee that interactions between the override rules are
well defined. Finally, there is a substantial body of
work on automatically verifying, analyzing and opti-
mizing SBM models, which could prove useful in de-
tecting conflicts between override rules or simplifying
them when their number increases.
3.1 Modeling DNNs and Override Rules
in SBM
We propose the following method for creating SBM
models that combine scenario objects and a DNN
controller. The core idea is to represent the DNN
as a dedicated scenario object, ODNN , to be included
in the scenario-based model. This ODNN is a non-
deterministic scenario that models the DNN con-
troller, thus allowing it to interact with the other sce-
nario objects. Let us assume, for the sake of simplic-
ity (we relax this limitation later), that there is a finite
set of possible inputs to the DNN, denoted I; and let
O denote the set of possible actions among which the
DNN chooses. We introduce new events to our event
set E: an event ei for every i ∈ I, and an event eo for
every o ∈O. We have our new scenario object ODNN
repeatedly wait for all events ei, and then request all
events eo. This behavior represents the black-box na-
ture of the DNN, as far as the rest of the model is
concerned: we only know that after an input arrives,
one of the outputs will be selected, without knowing
which. However, when the model is executed, the ex-
ecution infrastructure resolves this non-determinism
by running the actual DNN and triggering the output
event that corresponds to its selection. For example,
assuming just two possible inputs, e.g. i1 = 〈1,0〉 and
i2 = 〈0,1〉, the network depicted in Fig. 2 would be
represented by the scenario object described in Fig. 4.
We introduce the convention that other scenario
objects in the systems may wait-for, but may not
hidden text hidden
wait for ei1 ,ei2
hidden text hidden
start
request ey1 ,ey2
and block all
other events
ei1 ,ei2
ey1 ,ey2
Figure 4: A scenario ODNN for the neural network in Fig. 2.
Events ei1 and ei2 represent the inputs to the neural network,
and events ey1 and ey2 represent its outputs.
block, the input events ei. A single dedicated sce-
nario, called a sensor, is responsible for requesting an
input event when the DNN needs to be evaluated (e.g.,
following a user action). By another convention, no
scenario object except ODNN may request any of the
output events eo; however, other scenario objects may
wait-for or block these events. During execution, if
the DNN assigns the highest score to an event that is
currently blocked, we resolve the non-determinism of
ODNN by selecting the event representing the output
with the next-to-highest score, and so on. If no events
are left unblocked, then the system is deadlocked and
the execution terminates.
The motivation underlying our definitions is to al-
low scenario objects to monitor the inputs and outputs
of the DNN controller, by waiting for their respective
events; and then to interfere with the recommenda-
tion of the DNN, by blocking certain output events
from being triggered, which is the main use-case of
override rules. Note that a scenario object may force
the DNN to produce a specific output, by blocking
all other possibilities; or it may interfere more sub-
tly, by blocking some events and allowing the DNN
to choose among the remaining events.
In practice, our assumption that the sets I of pos-
sible DNN inputs and the set O of possible DNN out-
puts are finite might be a limiting factor: for example,
in the override rule described in Section 2.1, the rel-
ative assignments to x1 and x2 affected whether the
rule could be triggered or not, and so it is important
to express in our model the exact assignments for x1
and x2. Of course, there are infinitely many possible
assignments. To waive this limitation we again turn
to the extension to SBM (Katz et al., 2019b) that al-
lows us to treat events as variables of certain types.
We change our formulation slightly: scenario objects
in the system may wait-for a single, composite event
that indicates that values have been assigned to (all
of) the DNN’s inputs or outputs, and may then act ac-
cording to those values.
Using this extension, the override rule from Sec-
tion 2.1 is expressed as a scenario object in Fig. 5.
The scenario enforces the override rule that whenever
x1> 0 and x2< x1, output event y2 (and not y1) should
be triggered. Here, 〈ex1 ,ex2〉 represents a single event
that indicates that values have been assigned to the
DNN’s inputs. This event contains two real values,
x1 and x2, that the scenario can then access and use
to determine its transition. Event ey1 indicates, as be-
fore, that the scenario forbids the DNN from selecting
y1 as its output action.
wait for 〈x1,x2〉start block ey1
x1 > 0∧ x2 < x1
ey2
x1 ≤ 0∨ x2 ≥ x1
Figure 5: A scenario object enforcing the override rule that
whenever x1 > 0 and x2 < x1, output event y2 should be
triggered.
3.2 Liveness Properties
Override rules are typically used to enforce safety
properties (“bad things never happen”). However,
there is sometimes a need to enforce liveness proper-
ties (“good things eventually happen”). In particular,
this can happen in the context of online reinforcement
learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998) — where the DNN
controller might change over time, and we wish to en-
sure that it eventually tries out new actions. If these
actions turn out to be beneficial, the RL mechanism
will ensure that the DNN repeats them in the future.
Liveness properties are also relevant when there are
fairness constraints; for example, if we wish to ensure
that in a resource allocation system, every pending job
eventually gets scheduled.
An example appears in (Kazak et al., 2019),
where the authors discuss the Custard system: a con-
gestion control system that uses a DNN to moni-
tor the conditions of a computer network and se-
lect a sending bit rate, in order to minimize conges-
tion (Jay et al., 2018). In (Kazak et al., 2019), Cus-
tard is examined to see if there are cases in which the
DNN controller chooses a sub-optimal sending rate
that does not utilize all available bandwidth, and never
attempts to increase this bit rate. This kind of behav-
ior constitutes a liveness violation, which we would
like to prevent using an override rule.
SBM can encode the fact that one or multiple
DNN output actions should eventually be blocked,
thus forcing the DNN controller to pick a different al-
ternative. This can be enforced by having a scenario
object wait for n consecutive rounds where a particu-
lar output is triggered, and then block it; an example
for n = 3 appears in Fig. 6, where a scenario looks
for 3 consecutive DNN evaluations where y2 is trig-
gered, after which it blocks y2 once, forcing the DNN
to select another action. An alternative is to have the
override rule block the particular output event with
a very low probability (Harel et al., 2014), thus en-
forcing the fact that it will eventually be blocked with
probability 1.
wait for
ex1 ,ex2
start
wait for
ey1,y2
wait for
ex1 ,ex2
wait for
ey1,y2
wait for
ex1 ,ex2
wait for
ey1,y2
wait for
ex1,x2
block ey2 ,
wait for ey1
∗ey1
ey2
∗
ey1
ey2
∗
ey1
ey2
∗
ey1
Figure 6: A scenario object that enforces a liveness property
for the network from Fig. 4.
3.3 Automated Analysis
Scenario-based modeling has been shown to facili-
tate automated formal analysis (Harel et al., 2015c).
Specifically, the simple synchronization constructs
that scenario objects in SBM models use render tasks
such as model checking (Katz et al., 2015), composi-
tional verification (Harel et al., 2013b) and automated
repair (Katz, 2013) simpler than they would be for
less restricted models. We argue that these proper-
ties add to the attractiveness of SBM as a formalism
for expressing override rules.
One particular use case that illustrates the afore-
mentioned claim is deadlock freedom. As additional
override rules are added, perhaps by different model-
ers, there is a risk that a certain sequence of inputs to
the DNN might cause a deadlock. As a simple illus-
trative example, consider the override rule expressed
in Fig. 5: whenever x1 > 0 and x2 < x1, output y2
should be selected. Suppose now that another mod-
eler, concerned about the fact that the DNN might
always advise y2, adds the override rule depicted in
Fig. 6: after 3 consecutive y2 events, a different event
must be selected. These two override rules together
might result in a deadlock: for example, if the DNN
receives the inputs x1 = 2,x2 = 1 three consecutive
times, both override rule would be triggered, simulta-
neously blocking both output events ey1 and ey2 .
Such situations can be avoided by running a ver-
ification query that ensures that the system is dead-
lock free. This query can be run, e.g., after the ad-
dition of each new override rule. Should a deadlock
be detected, the counter-example provided by the ver-
ification tool could guide the modeler in changing the
conflicting rules— after which verification can be run
again, to ensure that the system is now indeed dead-
lock free. Of course, additional system-specific prop-
erties, beyond deadlock freedom, could also be veri-
fied.
4 EVALUATION
For evaluation purposes, we implemented our ap-
proach on top of the BPC framework for scenario-
based modeling in C++ (Harel and Katz, 2014) (of
course, other SBM frameworks could also be used).
The BPC package allows modelers to leverage many
of the powerful constructs of C++, while forcing them
to adhere to the SBM principles: each scenario is
modeled as a separate object, and inter-scenario in-
teractions are performed through a global execution
mechanism that BPC provides. Here, we used BPC
to model override rules for the DeepRM system for
resource management, and for the Custard system for
congestion control.
4.1 Override Rules for DeepRM
The DeepRM system (Mao et al., 2016a) (discussed
in Section 1) performs resource allocation: it assigns
available resources to pending jobs, with the goal of
maximizing throughput. As part of our evaluation we
implemented an override rule that prevents the DNN
controller from attempting to assign resources to non-
existing jobs, which is an undesirable behavior that
occurs in practice (Mao et al., 2016b).
BPC code for our override rule, implemented as
a scenario object, appears in Fig. 7. We assume that
the queue of pending jobs is of size 5, and that the
DNN’s output actions are denoted y0,y1, . . . ,y5. Ac-
tion yi for 1≤ i≤ 5 means that the job in slot i of the
queue should be allocated resources, and the special
action y0 is the “pass” action, indicating that no job
should be allocated resources at this time. We use x
to denote an event indicating that the DNN needs to
be evaluated on certain input values, available as pa-
rameters of x. The state of the job queue is part of the
input to the DNN controller. Specifically, we use x[i]
for 1≤ i≤ 5 to denote a Boolean value that indicates
whether or not there is currently a pending job in slot
i of the queue.
The override scenario object is implemented as a
class that inherits from BPC’s special BThread class.
The scenario object can then use the special bSync()
method to initialize a synchronization point with the
other scenarios in the model (including ODNN , the
scenario object that models the DNN controller). This
method takes as input three Event vectors — the first
containing the set of requested events, the second
containing the set of waited-for events, and the third
containing the set of blocked events. The bSync()
call suspends the object’s execution until the BPC
mechanism selects and triggers an event; then, if the
triggered event was requested or waited-for by the
scenario object, the scenario resumes execution and
can retrieve the triggered event using the lastEvent()
method.
Our scenario object runs in an infinite loop, each
time waiting for the input event x to be triggered.
When that happens, it examines x to determine which
slots of the job queue are occupied; and then synchro-
nizes again to block event yi for any unoccupied slots.
Note that this scenario object can never cause a dead-
lock, because it never blocks event y0.
class EnsureJobExists : public BThread {
void entryPoint() {
Vector<Event> emptySet = {};
Vector<Event> allInputs = { x };
Vector<Event> allOutputs = { y0, . . . ,y5 };
while ( true ) {
bSync( emptySet, allInputs, emptySet );
lastInput = lastEvent();
Vector<Event> blocked = {};
for ( int i = 1; i <= 5; ++i ) {
if ( !lastInput[i] )
blocked.append( yi )
}
bSync( emptySet, allOutputs, blocked )
}
}
}
Figure 7: A scenario object for preventing the DeepRM
DNN controller from assigning resources to non-existing
jobs.
4.2 Override Rules for Custard
As briefly discussed in Section 3.2, Custard is a DNN-
based congestion control system. The DNN controller
takes as input various readings about the current and
previous state of the computer network (e.g., through-
puts, loss rates, and latency), and selects the next
sending bit rate. Custard is a reactive system, de-
signed to be run continuously and use the results of
its past decisions (as reflected in past network read-
ings) when making its next choice of bit rate.
Due to the opacity of the DNN controller, one
concern when using Custard is that it might be too
conservative. Specifically, we may wish to avoid a
situation where the state of the computer network is
completely steady, and yet the DNN controller never
tries to increase the sending bit rate — and thus never
finds out whether there is additional, currently unused
bandwidth.
A scenario object that prevents this case is de-
picted in Fig. 8. The scenario looks for a situation
where the DNN’s inputs and outputs have been iden-
tical for the last n = 10 rounds, and when this is de-
tected it blocks the previous output action. Event
x represents here an input assignment (comprised of
multiple input values) on which the DNN has been
evaluated, and event y represents the DNN’s output
selection. Here, for simplicity, we do not examine the
actual values of x, and only look for repeating assign-
ments (in practice, we may want to apply this override
rule only if the physical network’s conditions are both
steady and good, indicating that there may be unused
bandwidth).
5 RELATED WORK
Override rules, sometimes also referred
to as shields, have been applied ad-hoc
in multiple DNN-enabled systems, such
as DeepRM (Mao et al., 2016a) and Pen-
sieve (Mao et al., 2017). Such rules, and related
forms of runtime monitors, are also found in
control systems for robots (Phan et al., 2017),
drones (Desai et al., 2018), and in various other for-
malisms which are not directed particularly at deep
learning (Hamlen et al., 2006; Falcone et al., 2011;
Schierman et al., 2015; Ji and Lafortune, 2017;
Wu et al., 2018). The formal methods community
has recently taken an interest in override rules for
systems with DNNs: for example, by proposing tech-
niques to synthesize rules that affect the controller as
little as possible (Avni et al., 2019; Wu et al., 2019).
Various aspects of the SBM formalism, es-
pecially those pertaining to the formal anal-
ysis of scenario-based models, have been
studied over the years. These aspects in-
clude the automatic repair (Harel et al., 2012a),
verification (Harel et al., 2015b), synthe-
sis (Greenyer et al., 2016a) and optimiza-
tion (Harel et al., 2015a; Greenyer et al., 2016b;
Steinberg et al., 2017; Steinberg et al., 2018;
Harel et al., 2020) of models. SBM is also a
key component of the Wise Computing initia-
tive (Marron et al., 2016; Harel et al., 2016b;
const int n = 10;
class PreventSteadyState : public BThread {
void entryPoint() {
Vector<Event> empty;
Vector<Event> allInputs = { x };
Vector<Event> allOutputs = { y };
Event lastInput;
Event lastOutput;
while ( true ) {
bSync( empty, allInputs, empty );
lastInput = lastEvent();
bSync( empty, allOutputs, empty );
lastOutput = lastOutput();
bool steadyState = true;
int i = 1;
while ( i < n && steadyState ) {
bSync( empty, allInputs, empty );
if ( lastInput != lastEvent() )
steadyState = false;
bSync( empty, allOutputs, empty );
if ( lastOutput != lastEvent() )
steadyState = false;
++i;
}
if ( steadyState ) {
bSync( empty, allInputs, empty );
bSync( empty, allOutputs, lastOuptut );
}
}
}
}
Figure 8: A scenario object for enforcing the Custard DNN
to choose a different action if the state has been steady for
n= 10 iterations.
Harel et al., 2018), which seeks to transform the
computer into a proactive team member, capable
of developing complex models alongside human
engineers.
In this paper we focused on scenario-based mod-
eling as a possible formalism for expressing over-
ride rules. There are other, related modeling
schemes, which could also be used in similar con-
texts. For example, publish-subscribe is a related
framework for parallel composition, which shares
many traits with SBM (Eugster et al., 2003). As-
pect oriented programming (Kiczales et al., 1997) is
another formalism that allows to specify and exe-
cute cross-cutting program instructions on top of a
base application. Both of these approaches, how-
ever, do not directly support specifying forbidden
behavior, which appears quite useful for specifying
override rules. Additional behavior- and scenario-
based models, such as Brooks’s subsumption archi-
tecture (Brooks, 1986), Branicky’s behavioral pro-
gramming (Branicky, 1999), and LEGO Mindstorms
leJOS (see (Arkin, 1998)), all call for construct-
ing systems from individual behaviors. One advan-
tage that SBM affords compared to these formalisms
is that it is language-independent, has been imple-
mented on top of multiple platforms, and can extend
in a variety of ways the coordination and arbitration
mechanisms used by these architectures.
The BIP formalism (behavior, interac-
tion, priority) uses the notion of glue for
assembling components into a cohesive sys-
tem (Bliudze and Sifakis, 2008). The goals that it
pursues are similar to those of SBM, although BIP’s
focuses mostly on correct-by-construction systems
— while SBM is more geared towards executing
intuitively specified scenarios, and resolving the
constraints that they pose at run-time.
6 DISCUSSION AND NEXT STEPS
With the increasing use of DNNs in various sys-
tems, there is an urgent need to ensure their safety,
specifically by using override rules. We argue here
that progress can be made towards this goal by us-
ing modeling schemes that model together the DNN
and its override rules. We propose to use scenario-
based modeling for this purpose, show how the basic
scenario-based scheme can be extended to incorpo-
rate DNNs, and demonstrate the approach on several
examples.
Moving towards a more structured methodology
for modeling override rules raises the following ques-
tion: as the number of override rules and their so-
phistication increases, could they fully capture the
model’s logic and render the DNN obsolete? We be-
lieve that the answer is negative, as override rules
often forbid some specific behavior, but still rely
on the DNN to prioritize among the remaining op-
tions. We believe that an optimal approach is to com-
bine a DNN component with appropriately modeled
override rules, while maintaining and enhancing both
components throughout the system’s lifetime.
Our work to date is but a first step, which we plan
to extend. Specifically, we intend to work on (i) cus-
tomizing the idioms of SBM, or related techniques,
to better suit integration with DNNs and guard them
in more subtle ways; and (ii) leveraging the other ad-
vantages of SBM, specifically its amenability to veri-
fication and automated analysis, in proving the overall
correctness of DNN-enhanced models. In the longer
run, we believe that work in this direction will lead to
the creation of DNN-enabled systems that are more
robust and easier to maintain and extend.
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